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NATIONAL COURT DECISIONS AS STATE
PRACTICE:
A TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE?
Philip M. Morement
Abstract
The creation of state practice through national court decisions
can be seen as a way for national courts to play a role in
transnational judicial dialogue. That is, cross-pollination between
national court decisions in different countries could harmonize the
law in those countries, creating consistent state practice and,
hence, customary international law. This proposition, however,
raises doctrinal and practical questions. Do all national court
decisions that deal with customary international law qualify? Are
there practical limitations to the use of national court decisions as
evidence of state practice and customary law?
This article examines the status of national court decisions as
state practice for purposes of the formation of customary
international law. It looks at the role of national courts in both
"norm creation" and "norm interpretation." In terms of norm
creation, the major doctrinal or theoretical approaches to
customary international law are likely to view at least some
national court decisions as state practice. Decisions of United
States courts related to customary law, therefore, may be viewed
by other countries as United States practice.
As for norm interpretation, consideration of foreign court
decisions as state practice faces several difficulties:
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inconsistencies between courts and practice of other government
branches, reliance by courts on national law versions of
international law, difficulties in understanding foreign legal
systems, and lack of judicial training in conducting surveys of
foreign judicial practice. These problems suggest caution in the
use of foreign court decisions in determining state practice,
dampening the prospects of their use in transnational judicial
dialogue.
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Introduction
In international law doctrine, one element in the creation of
customary international law' is state practice-the actions of states
and their entities.2 National court decisions almost certainly count
as state practice. The creation of state practice through national
court decisions can be seen as a way for national courts to play a
role in what has been called a transnational judicial dialogue3
between courts. That is, the cross-pollination between national
court decisions may harmonize the law in participating countries,
creating consistent state practice and, hence, customary
international law.4 This assertion, however, raises significant
doctrinal and practical questions. Do all national court decisions
that deal with international law qualify? Are there practical
I Customary international law means that which "results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. See infra Part I.A. (defining the elements of
customary international law).
2 State practice, or usage, or repeated state acts, may take various forms. See
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER, & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 74 (2002). These may
include "diplomatic contacts and correspondence, public statements of government
officials, legislative and executive acts, military manuals and actions by military
commanders, treaties and executive agreements, decisions of international and national
courts and tribunals and decisions, declarations, and resolutions of international
organizations ..... Id. For a detailed discussion of state practice, see infra Part I.C.
3 This phenomenon goes by various names in the literature, including international
judicial dialogue, transjudicial communication, global judicial dialogue, transjudicialism,
and constitutional comparativism. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "I'd Like to Teach
the World to Sing (In Perfect Harmony)": International Judicial Dialogue and the
Muses-Reflections on the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1321, 1323 n.6 (2006) (listing variations in terminology).
4 "Cross-pollination" refers to the process of courts from different countries citing
back and forth to each other's decisions.
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limitations to the use of national court decisions as evidence of
state practice and customary law?
The aspect of transnational judicial dialogue5 relevant here6 is
the idea that courts refer to decisions from other jurisdictions,
engaging in a dialogue and citing each other's decisions back and
forth,7 most often as persuasive authority.8 Thus, the process goes
both ways: national courts incorporate foreign precedents into
their decisions (acting as "norm internaliZers"), but also generate
decisions that foreign courts incorporate into their jurisprudence
(acting as "norm creators").9
5 See generally Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO.
L.J. 487 (2005) [hereinafter Waters, TJD] (considering the ways in which domestic court
decisions become a part of transnational judicial dialogue); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004) [hereinafter SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER]
(arguing that the world operates as a complex network of government officials, including
judges, who perform functions of global governance); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global
Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003) (describing how a growing
community of national and international courts act in concert despite national
boundaries); Melissa A. Waters, The Supreme Court, Constitutional Courts and the Role
of International Law in Constitutional Jurisprudence: Justice Scalia on the Use of
Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Unidirectional Monologue or Co-
Constitutive Dialogue?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149 (2004) (examining views of
Supreme Court Justices regarding the use of foreign legal precedents); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (2000) [hereinafter Slaughter,
Judicial Globalization] (describing interactions of judges that transcend borders); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 99
(1994) [hereinafter Slaughter, Typology] (describing the increasing communication
between national court judges from different countries). For a critical view of the idea of
transnational judicial dialogue, see generally Krotoszynski, supra note 3.
6 More generally, transnational judicial dialogue holds that national, supranational,
and international courts are developing various means of communicating and interacting
with one another to the extent that they are creating an informal global community of
courts. See SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 5, at 69-100 (describing five
categories of interaction); Waters, TJD, supra note 5, at 493-97 (describing three
categories of interaction between national courts: comparative law dialogue or cross-
citation in substantive areas; development of notions of jurisdiction and comity; and
face-to-face meetings).
7 See SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 5, at 69-71.
8 This has been most notable in constitutional cases and in other substantive areas,
especially human rights. Id. at 66-99 (describing substantive and functional areas that
reflect transnational judicial dialogue).
9 Waters, TJD, supra note 5, at 494.
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This interaction, or cross-pollination between national' ° court
decisions, may, over time, harmonize the law in participating
countries such that a "general and consistent practice of states"'"
emerges. 12 In other words, national court decisions may represent
individual state practice and may collectively come to represent
sufficient general practice to create a norm of customary law. If
particular national court decisions do eventually create a
customary law rule their influence could be significant.
This article examines the status of national court decisions as
state practice for purposes of the formation of customary
international law. It looks at the role of national courts in both
norm creation and norm interpretation. In terms of norm creation,
the article concludes that the major doctrinal or theoretical
paradigms of customary law are likely to view national court
decisions as state practice. Decisions of United States courts
related to customary law, therefore, are likely to be viewed outside
the United States as United States practice. Notable recent United
States Supreme Court decisions that may be treated as state
practice include Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 3 and Roper v. Simmons.14
10 The term 'national court decision' is synonomous with 'municipal court
decision,' as is the term 'national' with 'municipal,' for the purposes of this comment.
II RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102(2).
12 See Waters, TJD, supra note 5, at 526 ("judicial harmonization of state
practices" through transnational judicial dialogue may lead over time to the creation of a
customary law norm prohibiting the death penalty). Of course, it is unlikely that national
court decisions will be the only state practice involved in the creation of a rule; the
practice of other state organs will also be involved.
13 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). The plurality concluded that customary international
law helps to define the trial protections required by Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. Id. at 2797-98.
14 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005). In its decision forbidding the juvenile death
penalty, the Court did not apply customary international law explicitly, per se. The
Court, instead, consulted international and foreign law as confirmation of its
determination based on domestic law. The Court looked specifically at international
treaties and at state practice, noting that only seven countries have executed juveniles
since 1990 and that the United Kingdom abolished the juvenile death penalty in 1948.
The Court's decision could be seen as constituting U.S. state practice regarding the
application of the death penalty to juveniles. There may be a question whether the Court
ruled as a matter of domestic law, in which case there could be an argument that its
ruling is not custom-generating. There is some disagreement whether national
constitutions-and perhaps, therefore, the judicial decisions construing them-constitute
state practice. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (1980) (citing
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
When interpreters of the law-such as American courts-
consult foreign court decisions as evidence of state practice
various difficulties arise in relying on those decisions. The
possible inconsistencies between national court decisions and state
practice of other organs can make determination of a state's
overall practice difficult. In addition, it may not be at all clear
whether national courts are referring to international law or to
domestic transpositions of international law that have little to do
with international practice. It is, moreover, extremely difficult to
fully understand a decision from another legal system.
All of these features compound the difficulties judges face
when they act as interpreters of foreign court decisions in a
transnational judicial dialogue. Judges generally lack the
expertise, the language skills, and the time to conduct meaningful,
comparative surveys of foreign judicial decisions.15 This increases
the possibility that judges will use foreign court decisions
haphazardly and selectively, choosing only decisions that favor the
inclinations of the interpreter. Courts and others are likely to rely
on decisions that are more easily available, which will tend to be
those of developed countries and those with compatible
languages. 16
Therefore, national court decisions can be a deceptive
indication of state practice: in many ways they can mask the
complexities of the generating state's legal position. This does not
mean that courts and other interpreters should never resort to
national court decisions as indicators of state practice or for any
other reason. It does, however, suggest caution, dampening the
prospects of the use of national court decisions as state practice in
transnational judicial dialogue. It means that the use of foreign
court decisions should be sparing and careful, and perhaps,
restricted to decisions of a foreign state's highest courts.
In reality, national courts seldom conduct extensive surveys of
provisions of national constitutions as evidence of customary law); Louis Henkin,
Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 40 (1995/1996)
(stating that constitutions are state practice). But see Anthony A. D'Amato, Human
Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 54-55 (1995/1996) (stating that constitutions are not state
practice).
15 See discussion infra Parts H.C.2, II.C.3.
16 Id.
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state practice, instead relying heavily on the opinions of scholars 7
or on domestic precedent. When courts do cite to foreign
decisions as evidence of state practice, they often seem to do so
either as persuasive authority or without making their rationale
clear. ' 8 The use of national court decisions as persuasive authority
may suffer from the difficulties mentioned above and should also
be employed with care. But the use of foreign court decisions as
persuasive authority does not serve to establish a putative norm of
customary law, which could potentially have greater effect.
I. National Court Decisions as State Practice
This section will discuss doctrinal theories of customary
international law regarding the role of national court decisions in
the formation of state practice. From a doctrinal point of view,
there are few compelling objections to the use of national court
decisions as state practice. 9 Regardless of the broad approach
taken to customary law-a traditional view, a modem view, or a
rational choice view-national court decisions are likely to be
viewed as state practice.2 °
The general doctrinal debate about state practice has been
shaped by the orthodox positivist theorists in the early part of the
last century, who largely denied any role for national courts in the
formation of customary international law.21 They believed that
both treaties and custom resulted from the consent or intent of
states so that custom was essentially a tacit form of agreement.22
17 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (5th ed. 2003).
"When points of international law arise in a municipal court, and resort to the executive
for guidance does not occur, the court will commonly face very real difficulty in
obtaining reliable evidence, in convenient form, of the state of the law, and especially the
customary law, on a particular point. An ad hoc, yet extensive, research project is out of
the question, and counsel cannot always fill the gap .... Id. It is ironic that courts do
not refer more often to national court decisions as indications of state practice, given that
national court decisions and legislation very often constitute the most easily available
evidence of state practice. See id.
18 See infra Part I.A.2.
19 See infra Part I.B.
20 Traditional, modern, and rational choice views are discussed infra Part I.A. 1.
21 See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 1974-75 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 8-10 (1977).
22 See infra Part I.B. 1.
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Accordingly, only the practice of state organs competent to make
treaties in the name of the state could be considered state
practice. 3 Since that time, views about the nature of consent
required for the formation of customary international law have
relaxed, to say the least. Almost all the modem scholars who have
addressed the question agree that national court decisions do
constitute state practice.24
A separate question is the existence of restrictions on the type
of acts that can be considered state practice. Some writers have
distinguished between physical acts and verbal acts-including
claims and unilateral declarations-and have asserted that verbal
acts do not themselves constitute state practice.2 5  These writers,
however, seem to agree that at least some national judicial
decisions should be considered state practice.26 Still, a distinction
between acts and verbal acts may be relevant in giving less weight
to statements in opinions that constitute mere dicta or that have a
minimal effect on relations between states.
A. Customary International Law and National Court
Decisions
Decisions of national courts could contribute to the creation of
international law in at least five ways.2 7 Two of these were briefly
23 See infra note 83.
24 See infra Part B.3.
25 See infra Part I.B.I.
26 Id.
27 Three of these correspond to the sources of international law set forth in Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. "Article 38(1)... is widely
recognised as the most authoritative statement as to the sources of international law."
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (4th ed. 1997) (citations omitted). Article
38 provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.
[Vol. XXXII
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mentioned above: the use of national court decisions as persuasive
authority and their use as state practice in the formation of
custom. 28  In addition, national judicial decisions may be
"subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law., 29 They
may also reflect "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations., 30 For those who hold an expansive view of international
law, national judicial decisions could constitute a source of
international law rules by themselves: a transnational law or a sort
of international common law.3'
In order to discuss the role of national court decisions in the
formation of custom 32 we need to know something about
customary international law in general. In international law
doctrine, customary international law "results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation. 3 3 Thus, the definition of custom is composed of
two distinct elements: (1) a general practice of states (an objective
element), and (2) a sense of legal obligation (the subjective
element), sometimes referred to as opinio juris.34 This article is
interested primarily in the role of national court decisions as state
practice because that is their primary function and the issue that
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3
Bevans 1179.
28 See supra pp. 261-62.
29 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
30 Id. at art. 38(1)(c).
31 See, e.g., John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions
for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 547 (1993) ("The overall trend.., is to hear more such
cases [with an international impact] and effectively to develop what amounts to an
international common law that lies in between traditional domestic and traditional
international law."). See generally Richard B. Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic
Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 12, 47-48 (1970) (national
courts act as unofficial agents of the international legal order in rendering decisions
based on international law).
32 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
33 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, §102(2). Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice phrases the requirements somewhat differently,
referring to "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
34 Short for opinio juris sive necessitatis. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (7th rev'd ed. 1997).
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raises the most discussion. The role of national court decisions as
opiniojuris is discussed briefly, below.35
1. Approaches to Customary Law
Assessing the effect of court decisions on the formation of
customary law inevitably raises larger questions about the nature
of customary law because different views regarding customary law
may determine the role of state actions, including court decisions,
in its formation. The variety of views about the nature of
customary law is legion.36 For the sake of simplicity and
relevance, I will briefly characterize three broad approaches to
customary law: traditional, modem, and rational choice.37
A "traditional" view of custom, associated primarily with legal
positivism, 38 tends to regard state practice as the most important
element.39 Thus, the existence of a customary rule is determined
35 See discussion infra, Part I.A.2.
36 Indeed, the number of different views regarding the nature of custom is related to
the number of different views regarding the nature of obligation underlying all forms of
international law. Oscar Schachter listed a "baker's dozen" of theories of obligation in
1971-surely there are more now. Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International
Obligation, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 9, 9-10 (Stephen
Schwebel ed., 1971) reprinted in SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Martti
Koskenniemi, Ashgate/Dartmouth ed. 2000); see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A.
Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1119-20
(1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Theory of CIL] (describing briefly recent
theories about why states obey international law).
37 See generally David Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom, 39
GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 198 (1996) (providing a general description of views towards
customary law and correlating them with prevailing approaches to international
relations). The differences between these views have given rise to the criticism that
customary law is incoherent. See id.; see also J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 499 (2000).
38 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance
Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639,
640 (2000) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Modern and Traditional CIL] (discussing
the association between tradition customary international law and positivism and
between modem customary international law and natural law views).
39 For a discussion of the traditional and modem views and their implications, see
Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115,
149-150 (2005). See also Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757,
757-761 (2001) (discussing the impact of the divergence between traditional and custom
and its impact on custom as a source of international law); Goldsmith & Posner, Modern
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inductively, based on an accumulation of instances of state
practice.4 ° Opinio juris is of lesser significance, invoked as a
secondary step in custom formation,4 with variations depending
on the particular doctrinal approach taken. One approach involves
assessing whether states engage in particular practice from a sense
of legal obligation.42 This dominant approach serves to distinguish
legal from non-legal practice,43 separating, for example, practices
followed in accordance with diplomatic etiquette from practices
required by law. Another approach is to determine whether states
have essentially accepted a norm suggested by state practice.44
In contrast, the "modem" view, influenced by a normative,
natural law perspective sees opinio juris as more significant, to the
extent that state practice may have little or no role in the formation
of customary law.45  In the modem view, opinio juris is derived
more from what states say than from what states do.46  U.N.
General Assembly resolutions and declarations, ratified and
unratified treaties, and declarations of international conferences
and Traditional CIL, supra note 38 (describing the historical roots of the traditional and
modern view); Kelly, supra note 37, at 454-55 (criticizing the "new" customary law,
primarily on the grounds that it does not reflect state consent); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (discussing potential tension between
the modem position and U.S. domestic law); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
319, 325-330 (1997) (describing the impact of state practice on customary international
law in a human rights context); Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary)
International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (1995) (describing
the impact of customary international law in an environmental law context); Fidler,
supra note 37 (assessing the traditional, or "pedagogical," perspective of customary law
and comparing several modern perspectives).
40 See Roberts, supra note 39, at 758.
41 See id.
42 See MALANCZUK, supra note 34, at 44.
43 See Roberts, supra note 39, at 758.
44 See ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
66-71 (1971) [hereinafter D'AMATO, CONCEPT].
45 See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 38, at 640 (new customary law is "colored
by a moralism reminiscent of the natural law view."); Roberts, supra note 39, at 758-59
(modern custom is derived through a deductive process, emphasizing opinio juris and
de-emphasizing state practice).
46 See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 38, at 640; Roberts, supra note 39, at 758-
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can all contribute to the creation of opinio juris and, hence, to
customary international law."
Of course, these descriptions of the traditional and modem
views represent ideal types and many scholars hold a mix of
views. Scholars in both schools speak in the language of
traditional customary law, justifying their analysis of custom in
terms of the classical formulation of custom as state practice and
opinio juris. The modem school, in a sense, is simply pouring
new wine into old bottles.48 Nonetheless, the essential distinction
between the two approaches is clear.
The rational choice approach to customary law employs the
assumptions of rational choice and insights from game theory to
assess state behavior that seems to comply with customary law.49
Professors Goldsmith and Posner are the most notable exponents
of this approach, which they have described in a series of works,5 °
sparking responses and further scholarship in the area from a
47 See Roberts, supra note 39, at 758-759 (discussing multilateral treaties, General
Assembly resolutions); see also Kelly, supra note 37, at 484-85 (discussing declarations
of international forums); Goldsmith & Posner, Modem and Traditional CIL, supra note
38, at 640 (discussing ratified and unratified treaties, General Assembly resolutions, and
international commissions).
48 See Schachter, supra note 36, at 12 (stating that lawyers are made uncomfortable
because not all normative processes can easily be placed into traditional categories of
treaty and customary law, and so they attempt to treat these new processes as if they
were part of the more traditional categories). Some scholars who hold a strong version
of the modem position have asserted that this approach simply represents a new form of
international law-making, rather than a new type of custom, focusing on the consensus
views of the international community. See Jonathan I. Chamey, Universal International
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 543-45 (1993) (suggesting that the results of multilateral
forums may not conform to traditional customary law but may reflect an evolution in the
international law-making process); see also Bodansky, supra note 39 (critiquing this
development). See generally Hiram Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The
Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87 (1991) (arguing for
standards to distinguish customary international law and declarative international law).
49 See Guzman, supra note 39, at 131-33.
50 The series includes the following: JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) [hereinafter LIMITS] (collecting and updating
analysis from previous articles); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal
Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
Si15, S124 (2002); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on
Customary International Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 191 (2001); Goldsmith & Posner,
Theory of CIL, supra note 36; Goldsmith & Posner, Modem and Traditional CIL, supra
note 38.
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number of other scholars.5 In the Goldsmith-Posner view, states
cooperate in some very limited circumstances, which rational
choice theory can help to explain.52 That cooperation is due to
calculations of state interest and is unsteady, subject to the
changing winds of those interests.53 Thus, the sense of legal
obligation embodied in the notion of opinio juris is not relevant to
state behavior. 54 Similarly, the rational choice view reduces the
significance of state practice55 and would seem to eliminate the
significance of state consent in the formation of custom.5 6 Both
traditional and modem views of customary international law,
moreover, suffer in the rational choice view: neither is realistically
based on state consent; both are substantively vague; and, most
51 See generally Guzman, supra note 39 (discussing the alternative of a rational
choice framework for customary international law); George Norman & Joel. P.
Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541 (2005)
(taking an expansive view of rational choice theory to explain customary international
law); Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary international Law: A Response to
Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143 (2001) (arguing rational-
choice game theory says nothing about whether customary international law is a valid
theory of law); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: International Relations,
State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 839 (2002) (applying
a rational choice, game-theoretical approach to the law of state responsibility); Edward
T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002). An earlier assessment of rational
choice approaches to treaty and custom from an ethical perspective can be found in
FERNANDO R. TESON, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-103 (1998) (discussing
and critiquing rational choice approaches to international law on ethical grounds).
52 See LIMITS, supra note 50, at 10-13.
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., LIMITS, supra note 50, at 10-13. Most of those responding to
Goldsmith and Posner have done so in rational choice terms. Several scholars argue that
rational choice is capable of explaining deeper cooperation than Goldsmith and Posner
suggest, and they dispute Goldsmith and Posner's stark distinction between rational and
normative behavior, arguing that rational motivation for behavior does not negate the
legal nature of customary law. See Guzman, supra note 39, at 118 (considering how a
rational choice model makes customary international law more workable); Norman &
Trachtman, supra note 51 at 541 (examining treaty compliance in the context of rational
choice). See generally Detlev F. Vagts, International Relations Looks at Customary
International Law: A Traditionalist's Defence, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1031 (2004) (arguing
the existence of a normative pull to compliance and disputing the applicability of
Goldsmith & Posner's examples).
55 See Guzman, supra note 39, at 153-57.
56 See Goldsmith & Posner, Theory of CIL, supra note 36, at 1119-20 (dismissing
positivist consent theories).
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importantly, both are better explained through a rational choice
analysis of state interests.57
Of these three general approaches to custom, the only one that
seems to contest the role of national court decisions in forming
customary law is the traditional school, for two reasons. First, the
traditional school relies on state practice rather than statements,
and there may be some question whether judicial decisions
constitute state practice or mere declarations of law. Second, and
more important, the traditional school rests on positivist notions of
state consent, which, in their strong form, might require state
action by the executive.
The modem school seems to accept national court decisions as
indicative of custom 58 and, as a matter of theory, would not seem
to have difficulty with national court decisions as a constituent of
customary international law. The modem school includes a
broader range of statements and declarations within state
practice.59 The modem school is also likely to treat national court
decisions as expressions of opinio juris and be less concerned
about the existence or nature of state practice at all.6°
Rational choice scholars, such as Goldsmith and Posner, would
appear to accept national court decisions as state practice. This
may be because, from the rational choice perspective, state
consent is not relevant. Goldsmith and Posner explicitly state that
"[n]othing within rational choice mandates the particular domestic
arrangement by which a nation pursues its self-interest in
connection with CIL, and it is consistent with the theory that a
nation would commit itself to certain courses of action by judicial
enforcement."'" Thus, they say, although competence and
accountability reasons suggest that states would rather have
57 Goldsmith & Posner, Modem and Traditional CIL, supra note 38, at 666-71.
58 See Kelly, supra note 37, at 505-06 (describing and criticizing modern school
treatment of national court decisions as state practice).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Goldsmith & Posner, Modern and Traditional CIL, supra note 38, at 665. In any
event, in the United States the courts almost always defer to the executive's view of CIL.
Elsewhere, Posner and Goldsmith suggest that, in the absence of political branch
guidance, courts may be, in effect, deputized as the determiners of the national interest
with respect to customary international law. Goldsmith & Posner, Theory of CIL, supra
note 36, at 1169-70.
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political branches determine the national interest regarding
customary international law, rational choice theory does not
demand such a choice.62
2. National Court Decisions and the Subjective Element
of Custom
Although state practice is the most significant role national
court decisions can play in the formation of customary
international law, national court decisions could also constitute
evidence of the subjective element of custom. A thorough
treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, the identification of a few salient issues is in order.
There are at least two main variants of the subjective
element.6 ' The dominant approach has been to require that state
practice arise out of a sense of legal obligation,64 sometimes called
opinio juris.6' The primary rationale for this requirement is that
there must be some way to distinguish legal rules from practices
followed due to some other motivation, such as courtesy, comity,
or other non-legal considerations. 66 Another approach has been to
view the subjective element as a requirement for at least some
degree of consent by states to the formation of a customary law
rule.67 This view may be reflected in the definition of custom in
Article 38 of the I.C.J. statute: state practice must be "accepted as
62 Barton & Carter, supra note 31, at 665-66.
63 See Int'l L. Ass'n, Comm. on Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int'l L., Statement
of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law 30
(2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/customarylaw.pdf [hereinafter ILA
Report].
64 See id.; see also SHAW, supra note 27, at 66, 67.
65 One interpretation of this requirement is a "belief in the legal permissibility or
(as the case may be) obligatoriness of the practice." ILA Report, supra note 63, at 33.
66 Id. at 6.
67 See id. at 30; see also KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL
LAW 44-51, 61-64 (2d ed. 1993). The strong version of this voluntarist approach,
associated with orthodox positivism, would require every state bound by a rule of custom
to have individually agreed to it. See discussion infra, I.B.l. A looser consent
requirement could be satisfied by tacit consent, or even by acquiescence. See id. An
even looser conception of state consent might be described in the following way: some
states actively create a practice, some by initiating it, some by imitating it, and others by
acquiescing in it; other states may have done nothing but find themselves bound by the
emerging rule. See ILA Report, supra note 63, at 39.
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law . ' 68
A national court decision could satisfy the subjective element
in several ways. A court's decision that describes the approach of
its state in dealing with a customary law issue would constitute
very clear evidence of a state's acceptance of a rule. Whether a
national judicial decision itself satisfies the subjective element of
custom is a more complicated issue and may depend on which
conception of the subjective element one adopts.69
If we view the subjective element as a sense of legal
obligation, then almost any national judicial decision applying a
rule of customary international law may qualify in the sense that a
court necessarily believes it has reached its decision out of a sense
of legal obligation."0 It may be difficult to tell, however, whether
this sense of legal obligation derives from international law, from
domestic law, or from a domestic auto-interpretation of
international law.7' If the subjective element must reflect state
consent, whether national decisions qualify may depend on
whether the judiciary is capable of indicating consent on behalf of
a state. Even under a relaxed notion of consent, it may be that
some form of consent to a particular rule is required by some
number of states in order to begin creating a customary rule.
B. Doctrinal Views of National Court Decisions
This section assesses doctrinal views regarding the status of
national court decisions as state practice. The analysis follows the
classical paradigm-assessing national court decisions in terms of
state practice and opinio juris. This is still the dominant
framework for discussing customary law, even for most of the
68 I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(l)(b).
69 Note that we are discussing here a particular state's satisfaction of the subjective
element regarding its own state practice, not whether the subjective element has been
satisfied for states in general. See ILA Report, supra note 63, at 30.
70 See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE §10, at 26 n.6. (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM] (indicating that
judicial decisions provide their own indication of acceptance as law).
71 See Anthony A. D'Amato, A Reformulation of Customary Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 65, 65-66 (Anthony A. D'Amato, ed. 1994).
D'Amato comments that "without this objective element of internationality, one could
not tell whether the rule articulated would pertain to states in their international
relations." Id. at 67.
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scholars who subscribe to the modem view.72 Even rational choice
scholars, who are focused on rational choice explanations of
custom, dispute the classical paradigm refer to its concepts and
employ its vocabulary.73
1. The Historical, Positivist View
Positivist writers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries-a time in which positivism was the dominant
school 74-largely denied any direct law-creating effect to national
court decisions.75  According to their rigid dualism, national law
was incapable of becoming a source of international law directly,
either in the form of national legislation or judicial decision. In
addition, international law rested on sovereign consent, and only
the executive, perhaps also the foreign ministry, was capable of
exercising premeditated consent.
For orthodox positivist theorists such as Triepel and Anzilotti,
these conclusions followed from their conception of the
international legal order.76 In their view, only the common will of
72 See e.g., ILA Report, supra note 63, at 32-34.
73 See, e.g., LIMITS, supra note 50, at 23-82
74 See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 232, 236
(rev. ed., 1961); see also Symposium, International Law and the Nineteenth Century:
History of an Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 99, 100-01 (1997). From a somewhat
revisionist perspective, Professor Kennedy argues that orthodox positivism was not as
dominant in the late nineteenth century as has been thought. Rather, the "orthodox"
view was, in part, the creation of scholars who have since sought to react against the
positivist view. Id.
75 See Akehurst, supra note 21, at 8-10.
76 See generally CARL HEINRICH TRIEPEL, VOLKERRECHT UND LANDESRECHT (1899)
[French translation DROIT INTERNATIONALE ET DROIT INTERNE (1920)]. Triepel restates
his theory more briefly in Les Rapports entre le Droit Interne et le Droit International,
1923-I HAGUE RECUEIL 77 (1925). See also Nussbaum, supra note 74, at 235.
Oppenheim was more sympathetic toward the possibility that national decisions could
inspire the development of custom through state practice, but essentially held similar
views:
[F]or the existence of a rule, and in special for the recognition of a growing rule,
of international law it is ultimately not the attitude of municipal courts, but that
of the states themselves and their governments, which is decisive ....
International law is a law between states, which concerns states only and
exclusively; it cannot per se concern municipal courts, but only when it has
partly or totally been incorporated into the law of the land. The attitude of
municipal courts cannot therefore directly concern international law, although it
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sovereign states, consciously intent on creating law, was able to
produce international law.77 Because national law, as evidenced
by domestic statutes or judicial decisions, was derived only from
the will of a particular state, it could not affect international law.7 8
National law and international law were simply situated on
different planes:7 9 domestic court decisions reflected national law
only and were not relevant to state practice.8 °
In addition, international law rested on the common will, or
consent of states, realized through treaties or custom, 81 which had
the effect of privileging as state practice only the activities of the
state organs responsible for international relations.82 Only the
practice of state organs competent to make treaties in the name of
the state could be considered state practice for the purpose of
creating customary law.83 Only these organs had the authority and
the capacity (in the sense of being able to form intent or consent)
to bind the state internationally-thus, only these organs actually
made international law.
is, as I have shown, of the greatest importance for the science of international
law.
Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 339-40
(1908).
77 See Nussbaum, supra note 74, at 235.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See Oppenheim, supra note 76, at 336-41.
81 David Kennedy describes this model in the following terms:
Hence, positivism rooted the binding force of international law in the consent of
sovereigns themselves, on a loose analogy to the private law of contract, and
found the law in expressions of sovereign consent, either through a laborious
search of state practice or a catalog of explicit agreements. International legal
positivism is simply the working out of the private law metaphor of contract
applied to a public legal order.
Kennedy, supra note 74, at 113.
82 Luigi-Ferrari Bravo, Methodes de Recherche de la Coutume Internationale dans
la Pratique des Etats, 192 HAGUE RECUEIL 237, 260-61 (1985).
83 Karl Strupp, Les Rfgles Gindrales du Droit de la Paix, 47 HAGUE RECUEIL 263,
313-15 (1934) (conceding that a parliamentary resolution on a point of customary
international law, in a democracy, uncontested by the government, could possibly
develop a decisive importance); see also MALANCZUK, supra note 34, at 8-10 (discussing
Strupp's views).
[Vol. XXXII
2006] NATIONAL COURT DECISIONS AS STATE PRACTICE? 277
2. Contemporary Views Of Consent Related To
Customary International Law
For those who reject or question the positivist notions of state
sovereignty, state unity, or dualism, state consent is no longer, or
never was, relevant. 8' They minimize the role of states or state
practice in the formation of international law. 8' National court
decisions possess legal force not so much because they reflect
state practice, but because they express a sense of legal
obligation-opinio juris.6
Even those theorists who favor some role for state consent in
custom formation have moved away from the orthodox position
regarding state practice towards a more relaxed view.87 For these
scholars, specific intent to be bound by each individual rule is not
necessary.88 States may actively consent to some rules and simply
acquiesce to many others; sometimes state consent may be
assumed to the body of rules comprising international law as a
84 See, e.g., Barton & Carter supra note 31, at 540-41; Charney, supra note 48, at
536-38. In general, commentators with a more naturalist or monist view would take this
position.
85 See, e.g., Charney, supra note 48, at 536-38.
86 See Barton & Carter, supra note 31, at 547-48.
87 A brief note in the most recent edition of OPPENHEIM reflects this change, and
clearly is meant to address the orthodox positivist position, although it does not explicitly
state that purpose:
Unlike in the case of treaties, it is not necessary for the creation of international
custom that there should be on the part of the acting organs of the state an
intention to incur mutually binding obligations; it is enough if the conduct in
question, as in the case of decisions of municipal courts on matters of
international law, is dictated by a sense of legal obligation in the sphere of
international law. For the same reason uniform municipal legislation constitutes
in a substantial sense evidence of international custom .... The same applies to
other manifestations of the views of competent state organs on questions of
international law in so far as they partake of an undoubted degree of uniformity,
eg [sic] governmental instructions, state papers, etc. The difference between
custom and evidence of custom is not in practice as clear-cut as may appear at
first sight.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 70, at 26-27 n.6.
88 See id. Some states actively create a practice, some by initiating it, some by
imitating it, and others by acquiescing in it. Other states may have done nothing, but
find themselves bound by the emerging rule. See ILA Report, supra note 63, at 39.
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whole, or to the process of creating those rules.89
3. The Contemporary Consensus Regarding the Role of
Judicial Decisions in the Formation of State Practice
The contemporary commentators who have addressed the
status of national decisions are almost unanimous in their view
that a national court deciding a case of international law engages
in state practice. 90 With a relaxation of the consent requirement
and of the rigid dualism maintained by orthodox positivists, there
is no longer as strong a rationale for privileging the activities of
the executive. Many commentators bolster this conclusion by an
analogy to the doctrine of state responsibility. 91  There are
difficulties with all these rationales, yet, taken collectively, they
make a compelling case in favor of treating at least some subset of
national court decisions as state practice.
i. Relaxation of Ideas about Consent
Under the relaxed idea of state consent that prevails today
among even the traditional school, there is less reason to limit state
practice to the State Department or foreign ministry.92 If the active
consent of states to form each particular rule or custom is not
89 See D'AMATO, CONCEPT, supra note 44, at 41; OPPENHEIM, supra note 70, at 14;
MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-43 (4th ed., 2003).
Therefore, a customary rule may be binding on a state, even though that state has not
participated in its creation or explicitly acquiesced in its acceptance. OPPENHEIM, supra
note 76, at 29.
90 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 5 n.17 (providing the example that
national court decisions provided a basis for the concept of the historic bay); OPPENHEIM,
supra note 70, at 26; SHAW, supra note 27, at 78; WOLFKE, supra note 67, at 74, 148.
For a dissenting contemporary view, see Kelly, supra note 37, at 506. Kelly generally
takes a consent-based approach to custom, which may influence his analysis of national
court decisions, although he bases his specific criticism on other grounds. Id. at 506-07.
He argues that domestic courts generally do not "undertake a detailed analysis of state
practice in other cultures, are prone to accept the values of their own culture or the
political positions of their own governments as CIL, and overestimate the role of judges
in the customary law process." Id. at 506. All of these are potentially serious, practical
problems, but they are not theoretical or doctrinal reasons for rejecting national court
decisions as state practice.
91 See, e.g., Bravo, supra note 82, at 259, 284; Karl Doehring, The Participation of
International and National Courts in the Law-Creating Process, 17 SAYIL 1, 7 (1991-
1992).
92 See ILA Report, supra note 63, at 17.
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necessary,93 there is no longer a need to restrict state practice to
actions that supposedly evidence some sort of premeditated,
collective consent. The waning of the orthodox positivists'
extreme dualism also bolsters this conclusion: the actions of state
organs in many instances are no longer considered to be confined
entirely to the national plane.94 Several related rationales for
treating national court decisions as state practice derive from this
starting point.
First, since many state organs play a decision-making role in
foreign affairs, it simply would be unrealistic to exclude their
activities from state practice. 95 Under this rationale, the activities
of state organs, including courts and legislatures, that actually
affect international affairs should constitute state practice.
Domestic court decisions such as decisions concerning state
immunity or the extraterritorial application of domestic law can
affect international relations.96  The assertion of extensive
extraterritorial jurisdiction can give rise to diplomatic protests and
retaliatory legislation.97 In many states, national courts often share
the law-making function with the executive and the legislature.98
93 See id. at 39.
94 See Doehring, supra note 91, at 7-8.
95 [I]l faut ... faire la place qui lui revient aussi a l'activitd d'autres organes
(16gislatifs, judiciares, administratifs) si, pour une raison quelconque, ils ont, en fait, jou6
un r6le determinant dans l'orientation de la pratique de l'Etat auquel ils appartiennent.
On voit donc que, encore une fois, il est en rralitd impossible de srparer totalement
l'aspect international de l'aspect national des probl~mes.
Bravo, supra note 82, at 260 [It is necessary to place due importance to the activity of
other organs (legislative, judicial, administrative) if, for whatever reason, they have, in
fact, played a determining role in the orientation of the practice of the state to which they
belong. One sees, therefore, that, yet again, it is in reality impossible to separate totally
the international aspect of problems from the domestic aspect.] (author's translation;
emphasis in original).
96 ILA Report, supra note 63, at 18.
97 See id.; JANIS, supra note 89, at 329-30 (describing British responses to U.S.
assertions of antitrust jurisdiction); ILA Report, supra note 63, at 18.
98 See ILA Report, supra note 63, at 18 (discussing that where there is separation of
powers, there are often conflicting demonstrations of state practice on the same issue).
In the United States, there conceivably could be an argument that treating U.S. court
decisions as state practice undermines separation of powers considerations granting the
political branches primacy in the field of foreign affairs. That is, there might be an
argument that the political branches, not the courts, should have control over
international law-making activity of the United States. See discussion of separation of
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Judicial decisions can establish legal precedent, effectively making
law.
Two other related rationales are somewhat broader. One
rationale is that because the subjective element of custom-
acceptance as law by states-is the significant factor in the
creation of customary international law, the identity of the organ
that contributes to practice is not important.99 What matters is
whether states have accepted the rule indicated by state practice.
For the same reason, the formation of intent by entities acting for
the state is irrelevant for the creation of state practice.'00 The
actions of state organs other than the foreign ministry, such as the
decisions of national courts, can therefore constitute state practice.
ii. The Analogy to the Doctrine of State
Responsibility.
Under the doctrine of state responsibility, a state is responsible
for the internationally unlawful acts or omissions of its officials or
state organs.1 l1  The precise position of that organ in the
constitutional structure and hierarchy of the state is irrelevant.10 2
powers, infra, Section II.A. 1.
99 See WOLFKE, supra note 67, at 58, 74. Wolfke seemingly would count national
court decisions as practice, which may or may not also indicate a state's acceptance as
law: "Since it is not material whose activity constitutes the practice leading to custom, it
is quite natural to include judicial precedents in international practice, which, being not
only acquiesced in, but often even expressly accepted by states, contribute to the
formation of international custom." Id. at 74 (citations omitted).
100 See OPPENHEIM, supra note 70, at 26 n.6; WOLFKE, supra note 67, at 58.
101 BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 419-22.
102 See SHAW, supra note 27, at 541-49; Rudiger Wolfrum, Internationally Wrongful
Acts, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1398, 1400 (R. Bernhardt ed.,
1995). Article 5 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on State
Responsibility provides that the conduct of any state organ having that status under
internal law shall be considered as an act of the state concerned under international law,
provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question. Draft Articles on
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session (Apr. 23 - June 1
& July 2 - Aug. 10, 2001), U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess. Supp. No. 10, at 92-95, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001). Article 6 states that the conduct of any state organ-whether of the
legislature, executive, or the judiciary-shall be considered as an act of that state,
regardless of the position of the organ in the organization of the state. Id. at 95-98.
According to Shaw, these propositions reflect customary international law. SHAW, supra
note 27, at 548 n.47.
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Accordingly, any state organ can incur state responsibility,
including the judiciary, through denial of justice, for example.10 3
Extending the analogy to state practice, the acts of all state
organs-administrative, legislative, judicial, and sub-national-
constitute state practice. Because the state is a single entity, there
is no need to evaluate the actions of different organs differently. If
the acts of specific state organs conflict with one another, it is up
to national law to harmonize the conflicts. 04
While there is an appealing symmetry to the analogy to state
responsibility, the analogy is merely persuasive, not conclusive. 05
One can question the application of state responsibility to the
formation of international custom. Just because a state is
responsible for the wrongful acts of its organs, that does not
necessarily and logically lead to the conclusion that the acts of any
state organ should constitute state practice. The doctrines of state
responsibility and state practice are not directly related, and there
is no reason why a result in one area should control in the other.
Nevertheless, there is a conceptual connection between the
concepts of state responsibility and state practice. Underlying
both is the assumption of the state as a unity, 106 as the basic unit in
an international system consisting of sovereign states.
Accordingly, the only entity from which an individual or a state
can seek recourse for the unlawful acts of state organs is another
state.0 7  Similarly, only state practice creates customary
103 See SHAW, supra note 27, at 548 n.47, (citing, The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979), 58 Int'l L. Rep. 491, 558) (reporting that a grant of injunction
by English courts blocking newspaper publication violated the guarantee of freedom of
speech in the European Convention of Human Rights, Article 10). A country's judiciary
might commit a breach of international law, for example, by violating general principles
of orderly jurisdiction, such as denial of justice, or by the non-application or false
application of a rule of international law. See Wolfrum, supra note 102, at 1400.
104 See Doehring, supra note 91, at 7. National systems differ in their approach
toward such harmonization. In some states, the courts are bound by the opinion of the
executive in international matters; in others, the independence of the courts is
guaranteed. See id.
105 See ILA Report, supra note 63, at 17 ("It is certainly the case that the activities or
organs of the State other than the executive can also engage its international
responsibility; and although this is not a conclusive argument, in the present context the
analogy seems persuasive." (citations omitted)).
106 See Bravo, supra note 82, at 259.
107 See generally, International Law Commission, supra note 102, at 45, 51 (the
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international law) 0 8
The concept of state unity could lead to at least two equally
logical conclusions regarding what state organs speak for the state
in the formation of customary law. On the one hand, we could say
that the unitary state should speak with one voice, that of the
executive. On the other, we could just as easily say that the voices
of all state organs are equally competent to speak for the state.
Neither view is inconsistent with the doctrine of state
responsibility. Indeed, the orthodox positivist view of state
practice described above co-existed happily in the early twentieth
century with the standard view of state responsibility.' 09
4. Judicial Authority Citing National Decisions as State
Practice
Courts have not been troubled by doctrinal quibbles and have
cited to national court decisions as evidence of state practice."0 In
many cases, when courts refer to national court decisions,
however, they seem to do so without providing any justification,
making it difficult to determine how the court is using these
cases."' This silence regarding method may suggest that these
courts view foreign decisions primarily as persuasive authority, or
perhaps as a subsidiary means for determining international law.
State is responsible for the actions of all of its organs and international legal
consequences result in accordance with the Articles that follow).
108 See OPPENHEIM, supra note 70, at 26-27 (citing I.C.J. Statute, Art. 38(l)(b)). As
in state responsibility where the entire State is held responsible for the acts of each of its
organs, in a government with separation of powers, different organs can create state
practice and therefore international law. See ILA Report, supra note 63, at 18.
109 See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 80-82 (2001)
(briefly describing the history of law of the state responsibility for injury to aliens,
focusing on seminal cases in the first half of the twentieth century).
110 In addition, in a list issued in the 1970s, the U.S. State Department included
federal court decisions as state practice, along with other governmental acts, such as
treaties, executive agreements, federal regulations, and internal memoranda. DIGEST OF
THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1973 v (Arthur W. Rovine ed.,
1974).
III See LAMBERTUS ERADES, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND
MUNICIPAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE CASE LAW STUDY 213-16, 229-39 (Malgosia
Fitzmaurce & Cees Flinterman eds., 1993) (containing an unscientific, but extensive,
collection by Judge Erades of excerpts from, or summaries of, thousands of national and
international decisions dealing with a variety of international law topics).
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In the United States, for example, an often-cited formulation of the
evidence of customary law refers to judicial decisions without
specifying their significance." 2
Nevertheless, initial research confirms that courts in the United
States and elsewhere sometimes explicitly refer to national court
decisions as state practice. In Paquete Habana, for example, the
Court included national court decisions in its survey of past state
practice. 1 3  National courts outside the United States have also
112 The law of nations "may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by
judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law." United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (1980)
(quoting Smith at 60-61). For an example of a case citing this formulation see Tachiona
v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("It is well to recall that among
the major sources of customary international law are judicial decisions rendered on the
specific subject .... ").
"13 Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 691-95 (1900). See generally Banco Nacional
De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-22 n.21 (1964) (surveying foreign court
decisions for state practice regarding application of act of state doctrine); Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (conducting an exhaustive survey of relevant precedents,
including those found in foreign law and in foreign judicial decisions, to determine the
force and effect of foreign judgments in United States courts); Aquamar v. Del Monte
Fresh Produce, 179 F.3d 1279, 1295-97 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing "judicial decisions
rendered in this and other countries" as among the sources of international law and
referring to the "U.S., foreign and international courts' custom of presuming that an
ambassador has authority to speak for his or her country .... " but not citing specific
foreign decisions among its survey of state practice); Alan Schechter, Towards a World
Rule of Law-Customary International Law in American Courts, 29 FORDHAM L. REV.
313, 340-42 (1960) (surveying seven pre-1960 U.S. cases citing foreign court decisions
as evidence of state practice).
Early prize cases often cited to foreign judicial decisions or foreign laws. See, e.g., The
Anne, 16 U.S. 435, 447 (1818) (citing a French case). The courts of many countries,
including the United States, ostensibly followed the law of nations, rather than municipal
law, in prize cases. See David G. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 31, 50-51 (1995); J.H.W. VERZ1JL, W.P. HEERE, & J.P.S. OFFERHAUS, 11
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART IX-c: THE LAW OF MARITIME
PRIZE, 596-99 (1992) (national codifications of this principle). There may be some
reason for caution in relying on early maritime and prize cases as precedent for the
proposition that United States courts survey state practice-including foreign judicial
decisions and foreign laws-in order to ascertain customary law. This is because there
may be a distinction between "the law of nations"-which would include maritime and
prize law-as that term was meant in the 18th and 19th centuries, and "international
law," as that term is used today. See generally VERZIJL, HEERE, & OFFERHAUS at 596-99
(discussing how prize courts were not bound by international law but were in fact bound
by their own municipal law). The surveys of foreign laws involved in early prize and
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referred to national court decisions as state practice. 1 4  At the
international level, The Lotus Case'1 5 has been cited for the
proposition that national court decisions constitute state practice." 6
In that case, the permanent Court of International Justice surveyed
national court decisions on several points related to criminal
jurisdiction, seemingly in a search for state practice.'17
Some international and national decisions have cited national
laws, apparently as evidence of state practice.8 As state practice,
acts of the legislature would seem essentially indistinguishable
from acts of national courts. If national laws constitute state
practice, so should national court decisions, and vice-versa.
maritime cases may have been searches for what we would now call general principles of
law, rather than surveys of customary state practice. See Alfred P. Rubin, U.S. Tort Suits
by Aliens Based on International Law, 18 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 65, 71-72
(Summer/Fall 1994). Nevertheless, at least by the time of The Paquete Habana, the
courts' exploration of the law of nations seems more like a survey of state practice in
search of custom. Indeed, the Court in that case said it was searching for "international
law," not the law of nations. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
114 See, e.g., ERADES, supra note 11l, at 213-14 (citing Qureshi v. U.S.S.R., 64
I.L.R. 585, 597-602 (Pak. Sup. Ct., 1981), and Dralle v. Czechoslovakia, 17 I.L.R. 155,
157-58 (Aust. Sup. Ct., 1950)).
115 S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
116 See, e.g., ILA Report, supra note 63, at 6.
117 Lotus, supra note 115, at 23, 26-27, 28-29. The court, however, declined to
determine the role of national court decisions in the establishment of a rule of
international law. Id. at 28. In the Nottebohm case, the International Court relied in part
on the practice of national courts in resolving questions of conflicting nationalities,
though the Court was not engaged explicitly in an examination of state practice. 1955
I.C.J. 4, 21-23 (Apr. 6).
118 For international cases, see, e.g., Nottebohm, supra note 117, at 22 (relying
partly on national laws regarding the determination of nationality and seeming to suggest
that they constituted state practice); North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20)
(stating that national laws or parliamentary bills constitute state practice that could create
rules of customary law concerning the continental shelf). As for national cases,
Akehurst refers to several national decisions in Peter Akehurst, Custom as a Source of
International Law, 1974-1975 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 9, n.7 (1977) (citing the separate
opinions of judges Ammoun (at 129), Tanaka (at 175), and Lachs (at 228-29)); see also
Scotia, 81 U.S. 170, 171-73 (1871) (discussing national laws and regulations regarding
the display ships' lights); Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 688-700 (1900) (discussing
exemption from prize condemnation of enemy fishing vessels).
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C. What Acts Constitute State Practice? Physical Acts and
Verbal Acts
1. In General
In trying to determine whether a particular state action, or type
of state action, constitutes state practice, it quickly becomes
apparent that it is necessary to have some idea of what state
practice means. "9 In describing the element of practice in the
formation of customary international law in general, some writers
have distinguished between physical acts or deeds 20 and verbal
acts,'12 asserting that verbal acts do not themselves constitute state
practice. 122  The dispute over the status of verbal acts reflects a
basic distinction between the traditional and modern views of
custom, although even the views of more traditional scholars are a
mixed bag. 123 The skeptical view of verbal acts probably relates to
119 See Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law:
Customary International Law and Some of its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 523, 525
(2004).
120 "A state sends up an artificial satellite, tests nuclear weapons, receives
ambassadors, levies customs duties, expels an alien, captures a pirate vessel, sets up a
drilling rig in the continental shelf, visits and searches a neutral ship, and similarly
engages in thousands of acts through its citizens and agents." D'AMATO, CONCEPT,
supra note 44, at 88.
121 Verbal acts involve making statements rather than performing physical. ILA
Report, supra note 63, at 14. Verbal acts are sometimes called speech acts, and may
include claims, unilateral declarations, and resolutions. Id. More specifically, verbal
acts may consist of attorney generals' opinions, pleadings in an international dispute
(there are two sides to a dispute and both cannot be right), diplomatic speeches and
writings, foreign office correspondence, and public mass-media speeches. See Anthony
A. D'Amato, What "Counts" as Law?, LAW-MAKING IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 83,97
(Nicholas Greenwood Onuf ed., 1982) [hereinafter D'Amato, What Counts?].
122 See, e.g., WOLFKE, supra note 67, at 41-43 (subscribing to this view, but
describing situations in which verbal acts may be indistinguishable from acts of conduct
and admitting a role for verbal acts in custom creation, including as evidence of the
subjective element of custom); D'AMATO, CONCEPT, supra note 44, at 39, 51, 88-89;
D'Amato, What Counts?, supra note 121, at 97, 103-07; Alfred P. Rubin, The
International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1977)
(criticizing as without foundation the I.C.J. decision in the Nuclear Tests cases-Nuclear
Tests (Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 253 and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France),
1974 I.C.J. 457-asserting the binding force of some unilateral declarations).
123 In addition, the debate may highlight one of the logical inconsistencies of the
doctrine of customary international law, which may undermine its legitimacy. That is,
because verbal acts may constitute opinio juris, as well as state practice, the same
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the traditional emphasis on state consent, but also boasts a separate
rationale: states do not practice what they preach. 124  The
distinction between verbal and physical acts is relevant to the
status of judicial decisions as state practice in that it is possible to
view domestic judicial decisions, or some subset of them, as
verbal acts because they simply declare their interpretation of
customary law.
The debate between professors D'Amato and Akehurst
illustrates the arguments in favor of each position. 25  Professor
D'Amato argues that verbally claimed practices should not
constitute state practice for the following reasons, among others. 
126
First, claims lack the certainty inherent in actions. 127 In contrast to
claims, a state's acts are easily recognized. 28 Moreover, while a
state may say many things, many of them inconsistent, it can act in
only one way at one time. 129  Second, until a state takes
enforcement action, a claim has little value as a prediction of what
evidence could be used to satisfy both elements of custom at once, leading to "double-
counting." See Kammerhofer, supra note 119, at 526. At least where there is no
additional evidence of custom, there would be a collapse of the two elements of custom
into one, creating an "epistemological circle" and rendering one of the elements of
custom redundant. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 136-41 (1999); see
also Kammerhofer, supra note 119, at 525-29, 537-38 (discussing the views of
Mendelson in Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272
RdC 155, 206-07 (1999)). In addition, "a certain density and generality of conduct is
required" to form a customary rule and double-counting would mean there is less density
and generality of conduct. Int'l L. Ass'n, Comm. on Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int'l
L., 4th Interim Report of the Committee: The Objective Element in Customary
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 68TH
CONFERENCE 6 (1998).
124 See BYERS, supra note 123, at 136.
125 Id. at 133-36; Guzman, supra note 39, at 125-26, 151-53 (describing the
contrasting views of D'Amato and Akehurst, as well as other commentators).
126 D'AMATO, CONCEPT, supra note 44, at 88-89; D'Amato, What Counts?, supra
note 121, at 97.
127 D'AMATO, CONCEPT, supra note 44, at 88; D'Amato, What Counts?, supra note
121, at 97.
128 D'AMATO, CONCEPT, supra note 44, at 88; D'Amato, What Counts?, supra note
121, at 97.
129 D'AMATO, CONCEPT, supra note 44, at 88, D'Amato, What Counts?, supra note
121, at 97.
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a state will actually do. 130  Finally, claims often are self-serving;
states make them to advance their own position, rather than to
declare their objective understanding of international law.' 31 if
anything an interested party claims is evidence of international
law, then international law could hardly prohibit any actions at all.
Professor Akehurst points out that in several cases the I.C.J.
either treated verbal acts as state practice or looked for evidence of
custom in various verbal acts. 132  He argues that physical acts do
not necessarily produce a more consistent picture than claims or
other statements. 13  It is "artificial to try to distinguish between
what a state does and what it says," since some verbal acts are
clearly accepted as practice without a physical component, such as
acts of recognition.'34 As for predictability, in many instances
130 D'AMATO, CONCEPT, supra note 44, at 88, D'Amato, What Counts?, supra note
121, at 97.
131 D'Amato, What Counts?, supra note 121, at 97.
132 Akehurst, supra note 118, at 2-3, citing, inter alia, the Fisheries Jurisdiction
case, 1974 I.C.J. 3, 47, 56-58, 81-88, 119-20, 135, 161 (July 25) (in which ten of
fourteen judges referred to claims and protests by states in diplomatic correspondence
and United Nations conferences without examining whether or not the claims had been
enforced); the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32-33, 47, 53 (Feb. 20)
(treating the Truman Proclamation and similar claims by other states as state practice
that gave rise to a rule of customary law); Rights of United States Nationals in Morocco,
1952 I.C.J. 176, 200, 209 (Aug. 27) (looking for evidence of custom in diplomatic
correspondence and in conference records); see also ILA Report, supra note 63, at 14
(citing I.C.J. cases referring to various verbal acts, including Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 49-54, 83, & 85 (Sept. 26); Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 259-261 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97-109 (June 27); Fisheries
Jurisdiction, 1974 I.C.J. 3, 24-26 (July 25); Nottebohm (2nd phase), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 21-23
(Apr. 6)).
My review of these cases reveals these verbal acts to consist of the following: practice
of domestic courts in determining issues of dual nationality and domestic laws regarding
nationality (Nottebohm at 21-23); statements by states at international conferences
(Fisheries Jurisdiction at 24-26); statements by the parties before the Court, General
Assembly declarations and resolutions, charters of regional organizations, declarations of
international conferences (Nicaragua case at 97-109) (it is unclear whether these actions
constitute opinio juris, practice, or both); International Law Commission draft articles
and conventions adopted by the General Assembly (Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project at
39-41); statements by the parties in cases before the Court (Nuclear Weapons at 259-61).
133 Akehurst, supra note 118, at 3.
134 Id.
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states will act in accordance with previous statements. 135
D'Amato's position probably represents a minority view; the
majority of contemporary commentators appear to regard verbal
acts as state practice. 136  A number of writers have sought to
harmonize the two positions by suggesting that the distinction
between physical acts and verbal acts is one of weight, with
physical acts carrying greater weight than verbal acts not
supported by physical acts.
137
2. National Court Decisions as Verbal Acts
The distinction between physical acts and verbal acts may be
relevant in determining what kinds of judicial decisions constitute
state practice, or in determining the weight that should be
accorded to them. On the one hand, court opinions in some sense
can seem like a declaration about the content of international law,
a verbal act rather than a physical one. 3 8 On the other hand, a
judicial decision in a matter involving international law seems like
a physical act when it affects the interests of other states.
139
Most commentators seem to agree that at least some national
judicial decisions can be considered state practice.140 Professor
D'Amato has provided a useful justification for treating many
court decisions as the equivalent of physical acts:
[A] domestic court does not contribute to the development of
international law merely by saying that it is applying
international law. But any court does more than issue an
opinion; it issues a decision. The decision itself can affect
international interests, and if erroneous, can lead to retaliation
by the foreign state. The decision, moreover, embodies a
concession for reciprocal treatment when a similar case comes
135 Id.
136 See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 70, at 26; BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 6;
SHAW, supra note 27, at 64-66; ILA Report, supra note 63, at 14.
137 Akehurst, supra note 118, at 2 n. 1; SHAW, supra note 27, at 66.
138 See ILA Report, supra note 63, at 14 (stating that judicial decisions and national
legislation can be considered verbal acts); D'Amato, What Counts?, supra note 121, at
102 (addressing the view that national court decisions are equivalent to unilateral
opinions).
139 D'Amato, What Counts?, supra note 121, at 102.
140 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 6 n.17; OPPENHEIM, supra note 70, at 26;
SHAW, supra note 27, at 65; WOLFKE, supra note 67, at 74, 148.
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up in a foreign nation's domestic court system. In these
respects, decisions of domestic courts involving international
questions directly contribute to the form of international rules by
the process of custom. The decisions are acts of states
containing, in the accompanying opinions, their own
articulation.14'
In other words, D'Amato says, a judicial decision is like a physical
act-in the sense of constituting state practice-when it affects the
international interests of other states or when it embodies a
concession for reciprocal treatment.
Just because some judicial acts affect international interests,
however, does not mean that they all do. Certainly, a court
decision that expounds in dicta on international law should not
count as state practice.'42 We might also think of cases that only
affect the parties but do not have any international ramifications-
do they count as state practice? 43 If they do, that comes close to
141 D'Amato, What Counts?, supra note 121, at 102. D'Amato's characterization is
similar to that of the New Haven School, although D'Amato differs with the New Haven
School in several respects regarding the nature of customary law. Id. See, e.g.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 71, at 89-94 (excerpting pieces by
D'Amato and other scholars). Under the New Haven School approach, custom is a
process of claim and response in which decision-makers assert and assess claims by one
another, thereby establishing certain uniformities in expectation of behavior. Myres S.
McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J.
INT'L L. 356, 356 (1955) [hereinafter McDougal, Hydrogen Bomb Tests]. See, e.g., K.
Venkata Raman, Toward a General Theory of International Customary Law, in TOWARD
WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, 365
(W. Michael Reisman & Bums H. Weston, eds., 1976) ("[I]t is becoming increasingly
clear that customary processes require decision makers who are equipped with a better
cognitive map of social reality, with a more explicit conception of the intellectual tasks
of decision, and, in particular, a more sophisticated notion of nonformulated
communication). The conduct involved in making claims and responses may be viewed
as state practice; this state practice may include the conduct of any authoritative
decision-maker, including national courts. Id. "[D]ecision-makers... honor each
other's unilateral claims ... not merely by explicit agreements but also by mutual
tolerances-expressed in countless decisions in foreign offices, national courts, and
national legislatures-which create expectations that effective power will be restrained
and exercised in certain uniformities of pattern." McDougal, Hydrogen Bomb Tests, at
358.
142 See Bravo, supra note 82, at 285 (stating the necessity of distinguishing between
dicta and positions that form the basis of a decision).
143 Professor Alfred P. Rubin suggested this possibility in a conversation with the
author.
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saying that mere statements about the content of international law
constitute state practice.
Some human rights cases in United States courts may fall into
this category. Some cases may not involve government agents or
may involve such low-level officials that, realistically, foreign
state interests are not implicated.' 44 In other cases, however,
defendants are officials of foreign governments, major
corporations, and states that sponsor terrorism, and so cases
against them may involve foreign state conduct or interests. 145
These cases may raise foreign affairs difficulties for the United
States and those foreign bodies. 146
One way to resolve this issue-and to account for the blurry
distinction between physical and verbal acts-is to assign less
evidentiary weight to the judicial acts that resemble verbal acts.
Where a judicial decision affects the interests of the litigants in a
concrete way, but does not affect the interests of any state, we
might attach less evidentiary weight to that decision. Where a
statement in a court opinion regarding international law is mere
dicta, we might accord it no weight.
II. Difficulties of Considering National Court Decisions as
State Practice
A number of theoretical and practical difficulties result from
the treatment of national court decisions as state practice. To
begin with, if the acts of all state organs can constitute state
practice, there is a potential for conflict and inconsistency between
the positions taken by different organs within the state. From the
point of view of other states and of judicial decision-makers, such
inconsistency makes determination of state practice difficult. In
reality-and this is borne out in the United States-actual conflict
is fairly rare.'47 Still, in cases of conflict, the simplest approach is
to conclude that there is no determinative state practice. 1
48
144 See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN
AlT. 105, 105-07 (Sept./Oct. 2000) (many defendants under the Alien Tort Statute have
been small players or larger figures no longer in power).
145 See id. at 106-15.
146 See id.
147 See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
148 See Akehurst, supra note 118, at 22 (suggesting that only when the practice of
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Furthermore, courts considering customary international law
issues may be restricted to considering domestic law transpositions
of international law, such as implementing statutes or prior judicial
decisions. National court decisions, therefore, may reflect not
international law but a national interpretation of international law.
The result could be a court decision significantly out of step with
current international law, which would limit its relevance. A
potential example of an implementing statute that is a domestic
law transposition of international law is the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. 
149
In addition, there are inherent difficulties in fully
understanding a judicial decision from a foreign state. Several
significant factors may affect the meaning of a particular decision
within any particular legal system: the role of international law,
the rules of procedure and jurisdiction, and the composition and
status of the court. These difficulties may be compounded by a
court's ineptitude in international law, foreign law, and
comparative law. They may also lack the time to conduct
thorough surveys of state practice. Accordingly, courts are likely
to rely on decisions that are more easily available. All of these
difficulties may cause courts to employ foreign court decisions
selectively.
A. Inconsistency
1. Theory
If the acts of all state organs can constitute state practice, there
is a great potential for conflict and inconsistency. Internal
inconsistency could violate the traditional requirement that for
state practice to mature into a rule of customary law it must be
virtually uniform, both internally and collectively. 50 The degree
different organs is harmonized can consistent state practice develop).
149 See ERADES, supra note 111, at 952 ("[A] statute like the FSIA may turn out to
become a petrification of the state of international law as it existed in 1976.").
150 ILA Report, supra note 63, at 21 ("'Internal' uniformity means that each state
whose behaviour is being considered should have acted in the same way on virtually all
of the occasions on which it engaged in the practice in question. 'Collective' uniformity
means that different states must not have engaged in substantially different conduct,
some doing one thing and some another.").
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of uniformity required, however, is unclear.15' The I.C.J. has
required a minimum of uniformity and consistency in its
decisions, 5 2  but sometimes has allowed great latitude in
application.' Nevertheless, where state practice is clearly
inconsistent, there can be no sufficient state practice.
The difficult cases are those in which the judiciary and the
executive or the legislature have taken contrary actions or disagree
about the content of customary international law. Indeed, the
courts may differ among themselves. In cases of inter-branch
conflict, it would be tempting to say that executive actions
override others in order to resolve inconsistencies. 54  But, if we
have rejected the orthodox positivist position that privileges the
executive in foreign affairs, and have accepted that all state organs
are capable of acts constituting state practice, it is difficult to
accept executive primacy again through the back door. 15'
Accordingly, the better position for a foreign observer trying to
identify state practice where there is inconsistency-and certainly
the most straightforward to apply-is that no state practice exists
151 See WOLFKE, supra note 67, at 60 ("The requirement of practice being
uninterrupted, consistent and continuous also no longer holds good. Everything depends
on concrete circumstances. Certainly, interruptions of practice and inconsistencies in
such practice often prevent the formation of a custom. This does not mean, however,
that every inconsistency or break should lead to such a consequence.").
152 North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 73-74 (Feb. 20) ("[An
indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question. . state practice,
including that of states whose interests are specially affected, should have been both
extensive and virtually uniform .... ).
153 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 98,
para. 186 (June 27); Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138 (Dec. 18) (stating that internal
uniformity need not be perfect; minor inconsistencies are acceptable). In the latter case,
the Court excused some collective inconsistency in language that might also apply to
internal inconsistency:
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the
corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.
... [T]he Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of states should, in general,
be consistent with such rules, and that instances of state conduct inconsistent
with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not
as indication of the recognition of a new rule.
Id.
154 See Akehurst, supra note 118, at 21.
155 See id. (stating that there is no compelling reason to attach greater importance to
one kind of practice than another).
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under such circumstances.
Another alternative is to rely on a state's own allocation of
authority in resolving inconsistencies.'56 When national law
allocates authority over a particular area to a particular branch of
government, that branch's interpretation would be accepted. In
the United States, for example, determinations of sovereign
immunity are assigned exclusively to the judiciary by statute. 57
Likewise, where a constitution provides for executive or
legislative competence in the field of foreign affairs, the position
of those branches might be favored on that basis.
From the point of view of other states and of those attempting
to discern a consistent state practice, however, this is not an
entirely satisfactory answer. How are outside observers to discern
state practice when the practice of state organs is inconsistent and
when the mechanism for resolving them is likely to be opaque?
Accordingly, we could say that inconsistency between state organs
may be seen as an internal problem for states: all national court
decisions will be viewed as acts of state practice, and if states wish
to avoid conflict and inconsistency, it is up to them to develop
mechanisms for resolving differences.'58
An illustration of the difficulties may be seen in the following
example. There may be an argument in the United States that
separation of powers considerations 59 favor an exclusive or
156 Cf. Doehring, supra note 91, at 7 (arguing that national allocation of authority is
relevant only at the municipal level and that international law imputes practice of
governmental organs to the state involved).
157 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
("FSIA")).
158 See, e.g., Doehring, supra note 91, at 7 ("It is a matter for municipal law to find
harmonisation if the actions of the individual state organs contradict each other.").
159 "The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-'the political'-Departments." Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). Nevertheless, the U.S. courts properly
address a variety of matters involving international law. "Despite the broad statement in
Oetjen ... it cannot of course be thought that 'every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."' Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
Because of the authority of the executive, however, the U.S. courts will often defer to the
executive in cases before them involving foreign affairs. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 1, § 112, com. c (courts give particular weight to the position of the United States
government on questions of international law); see also Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks
and Balances: The Bush Administration's Effort to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17
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dominant role for the political branches in dealing with issues of
customary international law.' 60 This argument, however, is far
from resolved. Until it is resolved, federal courts will continue to
employ customary international law, rendering decisions that
occasionally conflict with those of the political branches. The
question of which branch is entitled to primacy when multiple
branches claim competence is for United States institutions to
work out. In the meantime, foreign observers trying to identify
state practice cannot be expected to weigh claims about relative
competence from competing institutions. Again, the simplest
answer is to say that there is no uniform state practice.
Nonetheless, consistent state practice may emerge from an
internal conflict over time16' through from the "convergence of
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 171-73 (2004).
160 There is extensive discussion in the academic literature regarding separation of
powers doctrine and application of foreign law by U.S. courts, which can only be
touched on here. Professor Ku, for example, argues that the executive has primary
responsibility for administering, interpreting, and applying customary international law.
See Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpretation of Customary International
Law, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 862 (2005). Accordingly, the courts should defer
absolutely to executive applications of customary law. Id. This authority may derive
from the "vesting" clause of the Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. II), vesting executive
power in the President, or from the President's general foreign affairs power. Id. See
generally Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153 (2004) (describing
functional reasons for allocating application of customary law to the executive branch
rather than the judiciary). For an argument that the vesting clause grants the Executive
primary foreign affairs authority, see generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001). But see
Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH L. REV. 545, 551 (2004). Others suggest that federal court
consultation of foreign decisions treads on Congress' lawmaking power, violating the
non-delegation doctrine, or at least the policies supporting it. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution and Non-Self-Execution,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1580-82 (2003) (arguing that the delegation to federal courts of
the power to apply standards of international law is problematic, especially in the context
of customary international law); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law,
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 291, 298-304 (2005) (arguing that deference to foreign
decisions would transfer federal power to entities outside the federal government,
contrary to the constitutional structure, embodied, in part, in the non-delegation
doctrine). But see Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International
Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1492, 1522-23 (2004).
161 See Akehurst, supra note 118, at 22.
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opinion between the powers that form the structure of the state."'
' 62
For example, the legislature could enact legislation
countermanding a judicial decision on international law and
stating its own position; this legislation, in turn, could be subject
to judicial review and interpretation. It may take a while for the
dust to clear in order to identify a consistent state position, and it
may be difficult to tell whether the process of development is
completed.
2. Practice
In reality, at least in the United States, national court decisions
on customary international law matters do not conflict frequently
with the position of the executive or the Congress, though
conflicts do sometimes arise.163  There are two reasons for this
relative lack of conflict. First, many areas that were previously the
162 Bravo, supra note 82, at 261. Bravo says, in full:
[S]i le syst~me des relations internationales doit 8tre fondd sur le principe de la
bonne foi, un probl~me important devient celui de la prdvisibilit6 du
comportement de l'Etat, ce qui soul~ve la question de la recherche d'un certain
degr6 de stabilit6 de l'Etat en question. Mais la stabilit6, i son tour, n'est que le
point d'6quilibre et de convergence d'opinion entre les pouvoirs qui forment la
structure de l'Etat, telle qu'elle existe rrellment, meme au-deli de
l'interpretation littrrale de sa constitution. On voit donc l'importance d'6tudier,
en plus des manifestations de la pratique qui 6taient ch~res A la doctrine
positivist, aussi d'autres 616ments pour s'assurer de l'adh6sion stable et fiable
des Etats aux valeurs juridiques en discussion.
[If the system of international relations must be founded on the principle of
good faith, an important problem becomes that of the predictability of the
behavior of the state, which underlines the question of researching, to some
extent, the stability of the practice of the state in question. But stability itself is
nothing but the point of equilibrium and of convergence of opinion between the
powers that form the structure of the state, such as they really exist, even
beyond the literal interpretation of its constitution. One sees, therefore, the
importance of examining, in addition to the manifestations of practice that were
dear to positivist doctrine, other elements, in order to assure oneself of the
stable and faithful adherence of states to the juridical values under discussion.]
Id. (translation by author); see also Akehurst, supra note 118, at 22 ("[D]ifferences
between the practice followed by different organs of a state tend to disappear in
time, as the views of one organ prevail over the views of others. From that moment
onwards, the practice of the state becomes consistent and, thus, capable of
contributing to the development of customary international law.").
163 See Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REv. 665, 684-86 (1986).
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domain of custom-sovereign, consular, and diplomatic
immunity-are largely regulated by treaty or statute, so customary
law is no longer at issue. 64
Second, where customary law is involved, courts are likely to
follow the guidance of the executive.'65 In his survey of American
cases involving customary international law, Phillip Trimble found
comparatively few in which the court applied customary
international law when the executive branch had not expressed an
opinion. 166 Of course, in countries where there is little or no
judicial independence, it is unlikely that there will be any conflict
between the judiciary and the executive. 161
Nevertheless, U.S. courts occasionally do resist executive
direction in international law matters, even in immunity cases
where there is a history of judicial deference to executive
preference. 68  Litigants occasionally have employed affirmative
claims based on customary law against the government, though
generally without success. 169  In addition, the courts sometimes
will employ customary international law to restrain executive or
congressional action 7 ' through the use of custom in interpreting
164 See id. at 679, 688-92.
165 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 112, com. c (courts give particular
weight to the position of the United States government on questions of international
law); Trimble, supra note 163, at 684-87.
166 Trimble states that of the more than 2,000 cases involving international law
decided between 1789 and 1984, fewer than fifty involved the application of customary
law when the executive had not expressed an opinion. Trimble, supra note 163, at 685-
86.
167 See RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 19-20 (1964).
168 See, e.g., Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(rejecting the Executive Branch's suggestion to extend head of state immunity to the
Philippine Solicitor General, because he clearly was not a head of state).
169 See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (not admitted
aliens are not entitled under customary international law to parole revocation hearings
because of contrary controlling executive and judicial acts); see also Curtis A. Bradley,
The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role
of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 480 (1998) (cases based on customary
international law against the government have generally been unsuccessful).
170 See Trimble, supra note 163, at 698 (use of the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law and the Charming Betsy canon are "way[s] of
limiting political branch authority."); Phillip M. Moremen, National Court Decisions as
State Practice, 2000-2001 INT'L L. ASS'N, AM. BRANCH, PROCEEDINGS 154-60, 166-70
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statutes and treaties, 7' or through the use of the Charming Betsy172
canon and the presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States law. 1
73
There are also situations in which different branches simply
take different positions in performing their functions. For
example, there have been periodic differences of opinion between
the courts and the executive in human rights cases under the Alien
Tort Statute [ATS],'174 although the Supreme Court's decision in
Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa may calm the waters. 75  The Executive
Branch has submitted amicus briefs or other statements of interest
in a number of ATS cases, 176 generally taking antagonistic or
(2000).
171 See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F. 2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir.
1981); see also Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9.5 (Thomson/West 2005).
172 The Charming Betsy canon holds that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, §114 ("Where fairly possible, a United States
statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an
international agreement of the United States."). The presumption against
extraterritoriality holds that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." E.E.O.C. v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949).
173 In addition to using custom as a standard aid to interpretation, the courts also
interpret statutes under the Charming Betsy canon and the presumption against
extraterritorial application. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 114.
174 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
175 The decision may not only resolve unsettled aspects of the law. The Court
suggested a strong argument for a policy of "case-specific deference to the political
branches." Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
176 The U.S. government has filed a number of amicus briefs in ATS cases,
including briefs in the following cases: Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (opposing jurisdiction); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 1-01-CV-1357
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (opposing jurisdiction); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)
(supporting jurisdiction); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (offering
restrictive interpretation of the ATS) reprinted in 12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 34
(1988); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir.
1987) (arguing that the ATS does not provide jurisdiction over foreign sovereign); Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985) (opposing certiorari); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
(supporting jurisdiction). See Brief of National Foreign Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 3 n.4, Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No.
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enthusiastic positions towards human rights litigation under the
ATS depending on the ideological cast of the particular
administration.
Essentially, the Reagan and Bush administrations sought to
overturn or limit the increasing judicial acceptance of ATS suits to
remedy human rights violations. 177 Much of the Reagan and Bush
administration arguments in these cases addressed domestic law
issues of statutory construction regarding the ATS and the role of
international law in federal courts.'78 Nonetheless, they also
sometimes addressed issues related to customary international law.
For example, the Bush administration disputed the ability of
modern customary international law-specifically, U.N.
Declarations and conventions not. ratified by the United States-to
create a cause of action.179 In at least one case, the administration
also disputed the existence and parameters of a customary law
norm.1
80
Furthermore, there are occasions when courts differ with
Congress. Perhaps the most prominent example in the United
States of a legislative effort to define international law was the
adoption of the "Second Hickenlooper Amendment,"'' which
attempted to reverse the application of the act of state doctrine'82
03-339).
177 See Jennifer K. Elsea, CRS Report for Congress: The Alien Tort Statute:
Legislative History and Executive Branch Views 21-22 (Oct. 2, 2003); Stephens, supra
note 159, at 183. The Reagan Administration reversed the Carter Administration's
position favoring ATS suits. After more favorable treatment under the first Bush and
Clinton administrations, the second Bush administration attacked the ATS with a
vengeance. Id. at 169-70.
178 See Stephens, supra note 177, at 183.
179 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal of the
Judgment Against Defendant-Appellant Jose Francisco Sosa at 24-31, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 99-56880), available at
http://www.state.gov/documentslorganization/6595.doc.
180 Id. at 22-29.
181 Current version codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000). See Howard S.
Schrader, Note: Custom and General Principles as Sources of International Law in
American Federal Courts, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 751, 757-58 (1982); Alfred P. Rubin,
Order and Chaos: The Role of International Law in Foreign Policy, 77 MICH. L. REV.
336, 343-45 (1979). Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to "define...
Offenses against the law of Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 10.
182 While the act of state doctrine is not a doctrine of international law, the
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by United States courts. That legislation provided:
no court... shall decline on the ground of the federal act of
state doctrine to make a determination on the merits ... [in cases
based on] ... a confiscation or other taking... by an act of...
state in violation of the. principles of international law, including
the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in
this subsection .... 183
Congress had previously set out its version of the relevant
principles of international law, including a requirement of "speedy
compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange,
equivalent to the full value" of the property taken. 184 This was a
much stronger standard for expropriating nations than United
States courts had previously applied'85 and expressed a certainty
about the international law of expropriation that did not then
exist.
186
The experience with the Second Hickenlooper Amendment
illustrates the danger of taking legislative pronouncements related
to international law at face value, without considering their
application by the courts. Most U.S. courts have interpreted the
amendment's provisions regarding the act of state doctrine
narrowly, confining the application of the amendment to a
relatively limited class of cases. 187  Thus, courts will often still
apply the act of state doctrine in spite of the amendment. The
inconsistencies between Congress' and the courts' interpretation of the doctrine
illustrates the potential for conflict between the branches in the international area.
183 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000).
184 § 2370(e)(1).
185 See Schrader, supra note 181, at 758 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,
383 F.2d 166 (2d. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968)). In that case, heard
after the adoption of the amendment, the court found that the international law issues
were governed by the less stringent standards used in the case's prior appearances in the
courts, in which the courts had found a violation of international law anyway. Farr, 383
F.2d. at 185 ("This allows us to leave undecided whether the standard set forth in the
Hickenlooper amendment differs from the standard which we applied on the former
appeal, and which we now apply again.").
186 In the very case that had prompted Congress to enact the amendment, Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court wrote: "There are few if any issues in
international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a
state's power to expropriate the property of aliens .... " 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
187 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
744 (1996).
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conflict between the judiciary and legislature seems to be moving
toward resolution, illustrating Akehurst's point that differences in
practice followed by different organs of a state tend to disappear
over time as the views of one organ tend to prevail.' 88
There is also a potential for conflict between the courts and
Congress (to say nothing of the Executive Branch) following the
Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.8 9 The Court
decided that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions' 90
applied to the conflict against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and that, as
incorporated into U.S. law, it prohibited trial by military
commissions. The Court noted that the Geneva Conventions
provide their fullest protections to individuals engaged in
international conflicts on behalf of signatory states.1 91
Nevertherless, the Court determined that Common Article 3
provides some minimal protection, in "conflicts not of an
international character" to individuals not associated with any state
who are involved in a conflict in the territory of a signatory, such
as Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan. 92 In addition, Common
Article 3 prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."
193
The military commissions did not constitute "regulatory
constituted courts."' 19 4  Moreover, a plurality of the Court also
determined, customary international law helps to define the
specific trial protections required by Common Article 3.195 The
Court's decisions on these matters arguably constitute acts of state
practice by the United States.
188 See Akehurst, supra note 118, at 22.
189 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
190 The provision is common to all four Geneva Conventions; citations here are to
the Third Geneva Convention for simplicity. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
191 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
192 Id. at 2795-96.
193 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
190, art. 3.
194 Harndan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
195 Id. at 2797-98.
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As this article was undergoing revisions, however, Congress
passed legislation that conflicts with some of the Court's
determinations and that may constitute inconsistent acts of state
practice. In the Military Commissions Act of 2006,196 Congress
provided the President with the authority to create military
commissions to try unlawful combatants, explicitly including
members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 97 In doing so Congress
declared that a military commission is a regularly constituted
court, providing all necessary judicial guarantees recognized by
civilized peoples. 98 Although Congress may seem to have had the
final word here, it is possible that the Supreme Court could still
address these issues again under its constitutional authority.' 99
B. National Courts May Consider Only Limited Sources Of
Law
One difficulty of considering national court decisions as state
practice is that national courts may be constrained in their ability
to refer to international law directly.in making a decision. That is,
they may be restricted by domestic law transpositions of
international law, such as implementing statutes or, in common
law countries, prior judicial decisions. 00 Even when statutes or
judicial precedent do not dictate a court's decision regarding
international law, they may significantly influence it. National
court decisions, therefore, may not reflect international law but a
national "auto-interpretation"' ' of international law.20 2
196 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
197 Id. § 3(a)(1) (promulgating 47A U.S.C. 948a(l)(A)(ii)).
198 Id. § 3(a)(1) (promulgating 47A U.S.C. 948b(f)).
199 See John Cerone, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Examining the
Relationship between the International Law of Armed Conflict and U.S. Law, 10 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS (online publication), http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/I 1/
insights061114.html.
200 Erades notes this tendency in cases collected from many countries:
The cases collected in this section show that national courts consider earlier
decisions of the court in their country as evidencing the existence of rules of
international law. The majority of decisions have been delivered by courts in
the common law countries. This may be an effect of the rule of stare decisis
obtaining in these countries and obliging them to. rely on precedents.
ERADES, supra note 111, at 213.
201 See Leo Gross, States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of
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This does not necessarily affect the conclusion that national
court decisions contribute to state practice, because state practice,
almost by definition, reflects a national view of international law.
To the extent that courts apply a national auto-interpretation of
international law, they are furthering state practice in support of
that interpretation. The difficulty, however, is that domestic
statutes and judicial precedent conceivably could dictate a court
decision out of step with current international law, such that any
state practice that resulted might be of limited relevance. In
addition, such a decision could conflict with the position of an
executive that is attempting to adopt a more modern position,
resulting in inconsistent state practice.
1. Statutory Codifications of International Law
This difficulty may be most acute in cases interpreting statutes
that codify customary international law, or, more accurately, that
codify a domestic auto-interpretation of customary law. 20 3 Even if
legislation defining international law reflects contemporary
customary international law at the time of adoption, customary
international law subsequently could diverge a great deal from the
Autointerpretation, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION
167 (Alfred P. Rubin ed.) (1993).
202 See CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96-97
(1965) (identifying these problems but discounting their seriousness); Daniel P.
O'Connell, The Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law, 48 GEO. L.
J. 431, 454 (1960) (stating that English courts are limited in their power to neglect
precedent and apply new or modified international law, so that English law and
international law can take divergent paths). This latter difficulty apparently has been
solved in English law; English courts are now free to discover what the prevailing
international rule is and to apply that rule, regardless of domestic precedent. SHAW,
supra note 27, at 109 (citing Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977]
1 Q.B. 529 (Eng. C.A.)).
203 See Schrader, supra note 181, at 756-59. Under U.S. law, statutes supersede
inconsistent customary international law, at least where the statute is unambiguous. See,
e.g., Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 93 (2d Cir. 2003); Committee of United States Citizens Living in
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004), the Supreme Court observed that Congress may "at
any time" preclude the application of customary international law "by treaties or statutes
that occupy the field." But see NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 171, at § 9.5, suggesting
without citing to authority, that where customary law changes following adoption of a
statute, there may be an argument that international law limits the statute.
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statute. At that point, cases construing the statute would have
limited relevance as modem state practice. As previously
mentioned, a potential example of such a statute is the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.
204
Furthermore, a court attempting to determine the meaning of a
term in a statute incorporating international law conceivably
would be required to refer to customary international law at the
time the statute was enacted.20 5 Once again, such a decision could
have limited relevance as modern state practice. This issue arose
in connection with cases applying the ATS to international human
rights claims. The question was whether courts, in determining
what constitutes a tort against the law of nations, should refer to
the law of nations when the forerunner to the ATS was adopted in
1789, or whether they should refer to modern international law.20 6
The Sosa Court resolved the issue with a compromise: "courts
should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations
to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized. 2 7
Before Sosa, most courts determined that courts must interpret
international law as it applies in modern times, but there was
contrary authority.0 8
2. Judicial Precedent
American courts may also consider themselves bound by
American precedent in their application of customary international
204 See ERADES, supra note 111, at 952.
205 See Schrader, supra note 181, at 758 ((citing U.S. v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490
(D.N.J. 1978)), construing a term in a 1790 diplomatic immunity statute in light of
sources available to the drafters in the 18th century, works on international law by
Grotius and Vattel).
206 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881 (2nd Cir. 1980).
207 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (2004).
208 See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 198 (1796) for distinguishing between "ancient" and "modern" law of nations).
Subsequent decisions treating the ATS cited this approach with approval. But see Tel
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812-16 (1984) (Bork, J., concurring)
(referring to the law of nations when the precursor to the ATS was adopted in 18th
century as crucial, if not determinative, to an understanding of the modern scope of the
ATS).
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law, and so may not look directly to international law. The district
court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,2 °9 for
example, stated:
As a district court, we are not free to overlook or neglect the
interpretation of international law reiterated a hundred times
over in the American courts simply because some other nations
in public debate and diplomatic correspondence have expressed
a different view. While it is true that there is no international
law, except to the extent that civilized nations having
commercial intercourse with each other, agree that such law
exists, and also agree to what it provides, this Court is bound by
precedent and must recognize the precedential decisions of
higher American courts unless and until withdrawn, set aside or
reversed.21 °
In addition, courts may simply refer to American precedent
because doing so is easier than attempting to discern international
law through the traditional methods of international lawyers.
Perhaps for similar reasons, courts routinely refer to the
Restatement of Foreign Relations,2 1 which sometimes reflects a
particularly American view of international law.212
C. Cognitive and Logistical Difficulties of Employing
Foreign Judicial Decisions
In addition to the difficulties of knowing whether a particular
court decision represents state practice, there are simple, mundane
difficulties in referring to foreign legal decisions. These include
the difficulties of actually understanding the context of individual
decisions, the logistical difficulties for courts involved in
reviewing foreign legal decisions, and the resulting temptation for
courts to employ foreign decisions selectively.
209 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified in part on other grounds, 658 F.2d
875 (2d Cir. 1981), and rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
210 Id. at 432; see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 2d 289, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that district court is obliged to accept
international law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and Second Circuit).
211 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1.
212 Cf. Paul B. Stephan, Courts, the Constitution, and Customary International Law:
The Intellectual Origins of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 33 (2003) (describing the role played by the views of
American international law scholars in shaping the Restatement).
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1. Difficulties in Understanding Decisions From Other
Legal Systems
At first blush, it may seem that when foreign courts address
matters of international law, there should be very little difficulty in
understanding them because of the common international law
subject matter. Nevertheless, different national legal and political
systems may possess individual idiosyncrasies that make it
difficult to assess national court interpretations of international
law. Judicial decisions are a product of a particular institutional,
doctrinal, political, and cultural context. 1 3 Outsiders are not likely
to be aware of many of these factors. Taking an opinion at face
value may "risk complete misunderstanding of its real meaning, its
true importance." '214  We have already seen how national
transpositions of international law can create differences in
national versions of international law.
In addition, rules of procedure, jurisdiction, the effect of
precedent in a particular legal system, the composition and status
of the court all may affect the "meaning" of a court's decision.215
For example, because the European Court of Justice does not
include dissenting opinions, it may make support for a legal
proposition seem stronger than it is.216 There is no way to know
whether a case was decided by a narrow margin or unanimously. 2
7
The composition of a particular court may make a difference in
how we understand its ruling.1 8 Certainly, the members of courts
in different countries will be affected by the culture of those
countries. The members of some courts, moreover, may be more
213 See Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1335-36 (2006) (discussing the use of foreign
precedent, primarily in the American constitutional context); Mark V. Tushnet,
Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cautionary Notes, with Reference to
Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649, 662-63 (2004) ("We must be aware of the way
in which institutional and doctrinal contexts limit the relevance of comparative
information.").
214 See Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1335.
215 See id. at 1340-41.
216 See id. at 1341 (citing JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN
INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION 56-57, 102-03 (Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds.,
2004)).
217 See id.
218 See id.
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or less liberal or conservative than others. Think of the differences
between the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in the United States.219
Another factor is the status of a court in a particular country's
judicial system. A court's status in a country's legal hierarchy
may affect the status of its decisions as state practice because they
are provisional, subject to override by superior courts, as well as
the political branches. Moreover, the opinions of certain judges
and courts may carry more weight. In the United States, the
decisions of certain appellate judges (Learned Hand, for example)
and certain appellate courts may be more influential than others.22 °
2. Judicial Capability and Logistical Difficulties
Another disadvantage to considering judicial decisions as state
practice is the relative lack of expertise in international law and
international affairs possessed by most national court judges.22'
Personnel in the state organs that are involved in international
affairs may be better trained and better informed than judges about
international affairs and about the political ramifications of taking
particular positions on legal issues. Of course, the legislature and
state organs other than the foreign ministry (including the
President) may also suffer from a lack of expertise, but that does
not diminish the status of their acts as state practice. 2
A more significant difficulty is a logistical one. Especially
given the steep learning curve in international law matters, courts
simply do not have the time to engage in surveys of state
practice.223 Indeed, courts rarely conduct surveys of state practice
at all.224  As Brownlie points out, "[a]n ad hoc, yet extensive,
219 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,
1605-06 (2000) ("entire circuits seem to have ideological casts, with the liberal Ninth
Circuit and the conservative Fourth Circuit currently perceived as being on opposite
sides of the spectrum.").
220 See, e.g., William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of
Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998) (employing statistical
analysis of citiations by U.S. Appellate Courts to demonstrate comparative influences of
certain appellate courts and certain judges).
221 See Trimble, supra note 163, at 713-16.
222 See Akehurst, supra note 118, at 22 (discussing how the possible ignorance of
the individuals in various organs does not affect the status of their acts as state practice).
223 See BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 52.
224 Id.
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research project is out of the question, and counsel cannot always
fill the gap .... In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that
courts have leaned heavily on the opinions of writers. 225
International courts and the courts of other nations do not routinely
cite to national decisions as evidence of state practice, probably
for this reason.
3. Haphazard and Selective Use
Related to these capacity and logistical difficulties are the
dangers of haphazard and selective use.226 Courts and lawyers
searching for prior state practice in general, and national court
decisions in particular, will find it difficult to conduct
representative searches, both because of time and information
costs. 227 Instead, they are likely to locate decisions that are more
easily available, which will tend to be those of the developed
countries. 228 For American courts, they are likely to be decisions
in English, or at least decisions that have been translated.
Furthermore, because of the difficulties of locating sources, there
will be a temptation to simply cherry pick those cases that support
229
a court's predilection.
4. Making Foreign Decisions More Accessible
Some commentators have suggested ways around these
difficulties. In the context of constitutional interpretation, David
Fontana has suggested existing mechanisms to make foreign
decisions more accessible to American courts. 230  For example,
Federal courts could appoint experts or special masters who could
help them with international and comparative law matters.23'
225 Id.
226 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 233, at 64-69 (discussing the problems of haphazard
and selective citation of foreign sources in constitutional interpretation).
227 See Guzman, supra note 39, at 127.
228 See id.
229 See generally Richard A. Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws,
Legal Aff., July/Aug. 2004 (arguing that United States courts should not treat foreign or
international rulings as precedent in decision making).
230 David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REv.
539, 562-65 (2000).
231 Id.
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There are also sources for locating foreign court decisions, such as
International Law Reports and a growing number of legal
databases.232 Further, increased education of judges could make
them more aware of resources and methods for approaching
foreign judicial decisions.233 Perhaps these measures will help
make foreign law more accessible and comprehensible.
III. Conclusion
Treating national court decisions as state practice is one way
that national courts can participate in transnational judicial
dialogue. Indeed, there is little doctrinal justification against
treating such decisions as state practice. Nevertheless, there are
various difficulties in relying on national court decisions as
evidence of custom, which suggests caution in their use and may
dampen the prospects for a transnational judicial dialogue based
on the creation of custom through national court decisions.
The practice of courts, the executive, and the legislature may
be inconsistent, making it difficult to determine a state's ultimate
position. In addition, national courts often refer to a national
version of international law, rather than to customary law as
practiced between states. For these reasons, it is extremely
difficult to understand fully a decision from another legal system.
Judges, who generally lack the expertise, language skills, and time
to conduct surveys of state practice, may have great difficulty in
understanding foreign decisions. As a result of these factors, and
the difficulties of meaningful comparative analysis, interpreters
may use foreign court decisions selectively, in a biased way.
These logistical difficulties may be ameliorated through
greater training of judges and greater accessibility of foreign court
decisions. In many cases, moreover, the basis of a foreign court's
decision and its status as state practice may be clear. But the
comparative task can be difficult for a capable expert, 2 4 and even
232 See SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 5, at 72 (noting the Lexis-
Nexis and Westlaw databases, as well as the CODICES website, which collects and
digests the decisions of constitutional courts around the world, available at
www.codices.coe.int).
233 See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the
Constitution, 98 Am. J. INT'L L. 57, 66 n.71 (2004).
234 Roger Alford mentions the possible assistance of increased judicial education
about international and foreign law but argues that independent comparative
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experts disagree about international comparative law.
investigation of foreign legal systems would still be incredibly difficult. Id.
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